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The 2003 reform of the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
replaced the coupled direct support schemes by a Single Farm Payment (SFP), which 
will be mainly delivered to farmers irrespective of what they produce (hence 
‘decoupled’ from production). The level of decoupling differs among the Member 
States. This paper assesses the implementation of the SFP across Member States and 
how far it has been decoupled. The expected changes in the European Union’s and 
New Zealand’s trade in dairy products and beef resulting from the 2003 reform of the 
CAP are simulated, using a partial equilibrium trade model (Lincoln Trade and 
Environment Model; LTEM).  
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1. Introduction 
 
Dairy and beef products belong to New Zealand’s main export commodities, 
accounting for 22% of total merchandise exports (Statistics New Zealand, 2004). The 
European Union (EU) is commonly known for distorting international trade in these 
products through subsidised production and exports. This leads to lower world 
market prices and hence lower export revenues for New Zealand (NZ).  
 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU has already undergone several 
reforms since its beginnings in 1962. It was established partly in order to ensure food 
supply in Europe in the post World War II period. At this time, the countries of the 
present EU have been net importers of agricultural commodities. The principle used 
in the CAP was to support farmers through the market rather than by direct subsidies. 
This was achieved by the creation of a protected unified market within the Union 
where domestic agricultural products were given preference. Minimum prices were 
established and high often prohibitive tariffs for imported products. European 
farmers responded quickly to the high domestic prices and increased production. 
This was favoured by fast increasing agricultural productivity through the 
development of new technologies in the 1960s and 1970s.  
 
The consequence was that the European Union switched from a net importer of food 
products to a net exporter in the late 1970s. Nevertheless, the policy did not change 
at this time and significant surpluses resulted. Agricultural surplus was (and still is) 
disposed of on the world markets by the aid of export subsidies. Export subsidies are 
necessary in order to offset the difference between the high domestic prices with the 
lower world market prices. Since the EU is a major exporter in many commodities, 
the subsidised exports depress world market prices in these commodities (Gardner, 
1996). This can be particularly expected in the markets for dairy products where the 
EU is the major global exporter, followed by New Zealand. In the beef market, the 
EU is the 5th largest exporter, equal to New Zealand.  
 
In order to limit the overproduction, the CAP has undergone several attempts to 
reforms in the 1980s. The introduction of a milk production quota in 1984 limited the 
excess supply of milk and the subsidised exports of dairy products. In addition to the 
internal difficulties, the CAP has become the main source of dispute with the EU’s 
international trading partners since the late 1970s (Howarth, 2000). High internal 
budget costs and increasing pressure from other countries during the Uruguay Round 
of the GATT gave rise to a major reform of the CAP in 1992. The 1992 MacSharry 
reform redirected the emphasis of farm support from markets to direct subsidies. The 
aim of this reform was to reduce the internal price of EU agricultural products, 
without undermining farm incomes. This was achieved by a cut in the domestic 
prices for cereals and beef and the introduction of direct aid payments to farmers to 
compensate for the impact of price cuts on farm incomes. The direct payments 
introduced in 1992 have been coupled to production, which means that farmers had 
to produce a certain crop/livestock product in order to get subsides. In the beef 
sector, direct payments were based on the livestock numbers, so the more cattle 
farmers had the more subsidies they got. The MacSharry reform made no change to 
the support of the dairy sector.  
 
 
The planned EU enlargement and the continuing WTO trade negotiations towards 
further liberalisation were the reasons for a further CAP reform in 1999. The Agenda 
2000 reforms brought price cuts in the cereal, beef and dairy sectors, starting in 2005. 
Coupled direct payments were introduced in the milk sector and increased in the beef 
and cereal sectors, respectively. Agenda 2000 was the set of reforms which not only 
dealt with CAP reform but also the future financing of the CAP, the structure funds, 
EU enlargement; and most radically it replaced the original objectives of the CAP 
with a set of objectives for a rural policy. Rural development has officially become 
the ‘second pillar’ of the CAP.  
 
The mid-term review of Agenda 2000 resulted in a new fundamental reform. The 
2003 reform (also referred as the ‘Luxembourg Agreement’ or ‘Fischler reforms’) of 
the CAP introduced a new system of single farm payments (SFP) and cut - at least 
partially - the link between support and production. The SFP is delivered to farmers 
irrespective of what and how much they produce (hence ‘decoupled’ from 
production) and it is based on historical entitlements. The main purposes of the new 
SFP scheme are to support farm incomes and – at the same time - to allow farmers to 
become more market oriented, giving them the incentives to produce for consumers’ 
demand rather than for CAP subsidies. However, Member States could choose 
individually to maintain a limited link between subsidy and production within clear 
limits. This is a new development of the CAP towards re-nationalisation of 
agricultural policy in the EU.  
 
The recent reforms of the CAP also take other concerns into account, such as food 
safety and the environment. In order to receive the SFP, farmers must maintain their 
land in good agricultural condition and comply with standards on public health, 
animal and plant health, the environment and animal welfare (cross-compliance). 
Further details of the implementation of the 2003 CAP reform are explained in 
chapter 1.2.  
 
The principle of the SFP has been used for other reforms of Common Market 
Organisations in products which haven’t been affected by the 2003 reform. The ‘2nd 
wave of CAP reform’ in 2004 introduced the SFP in the tobacco, hops, olive oil and 
cotton sectors. In the sugar sector, a reform was adopted in February 2006 and 
compensatory aids for sugar beet growers will be integrated in the SFP. Currently, 
the reform of the common market organisation in wine and fruit and vegetables is 
under discussion. Several reform options are assessed until end of 2006, but they will 
be in line with the principles of the 2003 CAP reform.  
 
The EU has changed significantly the way how it supports its farmers during the last 
15 years. Direct support schemes, introduced in 1992, have now been at least 
partially decoupled. The 2003 reform of the CAP enables a shift of a great part of 
farm support from the WTO blue box to the green box (European Commission, 
2006a). Green box subsidies “must not distort trade, or at most cause minimal 
distortion” (WTO, 2006). However, subsidies that try to decouple payment from 
output levels may have the effect of keeping production in existence when the 
optimal solution may be for it to cease altogether (OECD, 2003). This means that 
even the new single farm payment scheme might contribute to distort production in 
the EU and its international trade. In particular its implementation in some countries 
is not fully decoupled. 
 
The main objective of this paper is to look at the implementation of the SFP 
across Member States and assess the implications of the CAP reform on New 
Zealand dairy and beef sectors.  
 
First, Chapter 1.1 briefly summarises the direct support schemes under the CAP. This 
is followed by a description of the CAP reform implementation in the Member 
States. Chapter 2 gives an overview about the present literature analysing the 
implications of EU agricultural policy on NZ and the effects of the 2003 CAP 
reform, particularly on the dairy and beef sectors. In Chapter 3 follows a description 
of the methodology used to answer the research question. A partial equilibrium trade 
model (Lincoln Trade and Environment Model) is applied to simulate the effects of 
the CAP reform on NZ agriculture. The scenarios used for the trade modelling are 
also described in this chapter. Chapter 4 shows the results of the trade modelling and 
discusses them with other studies. Finally, in Chapter 5, the conclusion summarises 
the results and evaluates future implications of the CAP on NZ.  
 
1.1. Direct Support Schemes under the CAP 
 
Direct payments now contribute to 63% of the total agricultural budget. In 2006, 
€34.8 billion are spent on direct payments (European Commission, 2006b). A major 
proportion of the direct payments to EU farmers is since 2005 the Single Farm 
Payment. In 2006, €14.6 billion will go into the Single Payment Scheme in the EU-
15, which is 42% of all direct payments. The European Commission (2005) 
estimated that in 2012 approximately 90% of the budgetary transfers in the form of 
direct payments for the arable crops, milk, beef and sheep sectors will be part of the 
single farm payment for the EU-25 as a whole. The premiums relevant for the dairy 
and beef sectors are described in more detail below.  
 
Dairy premium 
The dairy premium was introduced in the Agenda 2000 reforms in order to 
compensate for the reductions in the intervention prices for butter and skim milk 
powder and the increase in the milk production quota. It was introduced as a coupled 
direct payment, granted per calendar year, per holding and per tonne of milk. Milk 
producers qualify for a dairy premium from 2004 to 2007. From 2007 on (in some 
Member States from 2005 on), the dairy premium will be decoupled and included in 
the SFP. The amount of the dairy premium is calculated by multiplying the reference 
quantity for milk available on the holding on 31 March of the calendar year 
concerned by: 
o €8.15/t for the calendar year 2004,  
o €16.31/t for the calendar year 2005, 
o €24.49/t for the calendar year 2006 and for the following calendar years 
(European Commission, 2003). 
 
Additional payments for milk producers 
Member States can make additional payments to their producers on a yearly basis. 
The total amounts for each country are fixed by the European Commission and 
account for €1 294 million for the whole EU-15 in 2006 and 2007. Additional 
payments are granted as a supplementary amount per dairy premium amount as set 
out above. 
 
Suckler-cow premiums 
The suckler cow premium is an annual premium of €200 per eligible animal per 
calendar year. The condition to the premium is that the farmer does not supply milk 
or milk products from his farm as it was introduced to promote the conversion from 
dairy farming to beef cattle farming. National and individual ceilings in the number 
of eligible animals apply. The number of animals qualifying for the suckler-cow 
premium also depends on the application of a stocking density. The maximum 
stocking density is 1.8 livestock units (LU) per farm, hectare and calendar year. 
Several Member States (Austria, Belgium, France, Portugal, Spain) are keeping the 
suckler cow premium coupled even after the 2003 reform, whereas the other Member 
States include it in the SFP.  
 
Additional suckler-cow premium 
Member States may grant an additional national suckler cow premium, up to a 
maximum of €50 per animal. Under certain circumstances, this additional premium is 
financed partly or completely by the Guarantee Section of the European Guidance 
and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF).  
 
Beef slaughter premium — Calves 
The slaughter premium is granted on slaughter of eligible animals or their export to a 
third country. It amounts €50 for calves of more than one and less than eight months 
age and a carcass weight up to 185 kg. Some Member States (Austria, France, 
Belgium, Netherlands) made use of the option to keep the slaughter premium for 
calves coupled.  
 
Beef slaughter premium — Adults 
Like the slaughter premium for calves, the slaughter premium for adults is paid at 
slaughter or export to a third country. It amounts €80 and is granted for bulls, steers, 
cows and heifers from the age of eight months. The European Commission allowed 
Member States to keep 40% of the slaughter premium for adults (€32) coupled, the 
rest is included in the SFP. Austria, France, Portugal and Spain made use of this 
option, whereas the Netherlands keep the adult slaughter premium 100% coupled.  
 
Beef special premium 
A farmer holding male bovine animals may qualify for a special premium, granted 
per calendar year and per holding, set at €210 per eligible bull and €150 per eligible 
steer and age bracket. The beef special premium will still remain for 75% coupled in 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden and is included in the SFP in the other Member 
States.  
 
Deseasonalisation premiums 
Where the number of steers slaughtered in a Member State in a given year exceeds 
60% of the total number of male bovine animals slaughtered that year and where the 
number of steers slaughtered from 1 September to 30 November of a given year 
exceeds 35% of the total number of steers slaughtered that year, producers may 
qualify for the deseasonalisation premium. The premium lies between €18.11 and 
€72.45, depending on the time of the year. 
 
 
Beef extensification premium 
Farmers receiving the beef special premium and/or the suckler cow premium may 
qualify for an extensification payment. It is €100 per special premium and suckler 
cow premium granted, provided that in respect of the calendar year concerned the 
stocking density on the holding concerned is less than or equal to 1.4 livestock units 
(LU) per hectare. 
 
Additional payments to beef producers 
Member States are allowed to make additional payments to farmers, according to 
objective criteria including the relevant production structures and conditions, in order 
to ensure equal treatment between farmers and to avoid market and competition 
distortions. Additional payments may be made in the form of headage payments (per 
male bovine animal, suckler cow, dairy cow or heifer, respectively) and/or area 
payments (per hectare of permanent pasture) and are subject to national ceilings.  
 
In addition to the direct payments in the dairy and beef sectors, support schemes for 
sheep and goats, arable crops, rice, starch potatoes, grain legumes, protein crops, 
seeds, olive oil, nuts and energy crops have been affected by the 2003 reform of the 
CAP.  
 
Limitation 
Many support schemes are not part of the decoupling process (e.g. subsidies for agri-
environmental programmes and payments for farms in less favoured areas). Also 
exempt from the decoupling process are national farm policy expenditures which add 
up to almost €15 billion per year. An evaluation of the impact of the CAP reform 
therefore may also be affected by the financial flows that are not affected by the 
reform, but have a significant influence on production decisions of farmers. In the 
case of Austria, for example, the sum of national agri-environmental payments plus 
support for farms in less favoured areas significantly outweighs EU direct payments.  
 
1.2. Implementation of the 2003 CAP reform 
 
As a new element the 2003 CAP reform has provided a large space for national 
initiatives (Halmai & Elekes, 2005). The following elements of the reform fell within 
national jurisdiction: 
• possibility of partial decoupling 
• selection of the SFP calculation model 
• date of introduction (between 2005 and 2007) 
• re-allocation of subsidies (modulation) 
 
The possibility of partial decoupling was provided in order to avoid abandonment of 
production. Member States could choose to maintain a limited link between subsidy 
and production under well defined conditions and within clear limits. Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom chose to maximise, while 
France chose to minimise the degree of decoupling. The options chosen by three 
Member States (United Kingdom, Austria, France) are shown in Table 1. The United 
Kingdom was selected as an example for the highest degree of decoupling - 
contrarily to France which opted for the lowest degree of decoupling. Austria lies 
somewhere in between with only premiums in the beef sector remaining coupled.  
 
The European Commission proposed different models to calculate the SFP, including 
a model based on historic data, a regional model and a hybrid system. The majority 
of Member States will base the SFP on farm level historical entitlements, with 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden and the United Kingdom using a 
mix of both farm level historical and regionalised payments. In case of the United 
Kingdom, the individual countries (England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) 
have each chosen a slightly different option. Entitlements for single farm payments 
are calculated on the basis of direct payments received in the reference period 2000-
2002. The majority of EU-15 countries started to implement the single payment 
scheme in 2005, with the rest (Finland, France, Greece, the Netherlands and Spain) 
commencing in 2006. The new Member States implemented single area payment 
schemes in 2004, providing a flat rate averaging EUR 48 per hectare for all 
agricultural land.  
 
Table 1: National Implementation of the 2003 CAP Reform in Selected 
Countries. 
 
Country Premiums that remain coupled 
United Kingdom None 
Austria 
Suckler cow premium (100%) 
Slaughter premium calves (100%) 
Slaughter premium adults (40%) 
France 
Suckler cow premium (100%) 
Slaughter premium calves (100%) 
Slaughter premium adults (40%) 
Eve premium (50%) 
Arable crops area payment (25%) 
Outhermost regions (100%) 
Seed aid (some species) 
 
Source: European Commission, 2006b  
 
The Member States play the leading role in ensuring cross-compliance is applied. 
Their responsibilities include establishing the definition of good agricultural and 
environmental condition for their agricultural circumstances. The maintenance of 
agricultural land in good agricultural and environmental condition is intended to 
avoid the abandonment of agricultural land and its environmental consequences. 
Basically, the regulations are very similar across the Member States and most cross-
compliance regulations have already been part of existing law in all Member States, 
so farmers do not have to do anything different in order to comply. Hence, cross-
compliance has not really an effect on production and therefore the introduction of 
cross-compliance is not included here in the modelling of the impacts of the  2003 
CAP reform.  
 
Furthermore, the Member States had to decide on the introduction of a national 
modulation. Modulation is the reduction of direct payments and re-allocation of 
subsidies to rural development measures. The obligatory modulation is 3% in 2005, 
4% in 2006 and then 5% annually until 2012. This regulation shows the efforts to 
redirect the CAP from only farm support towards a more comprehensive rural 
development policy. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union and its reforms are widely 
discussed in the literature. There are a number of relatively recent studies analysing 
the impact of the CAP reforms on the agricultural sectors of countries and regions 
around the world, but not that many publications address New Zealand particularly. 
 
Saunders & Mayrhofer (2003) investigated the implications for NZ trade of change 
in EU agricultural policy; in particular the development of agri-environmental policy, 
and used the Lincoln Trade and Environment Model (LTEM) for that. This study 
was done before the introduction of the SFP scheme, but includes a very similar 
scenario, since the 2003 CAP reform was at a proposal stage at that time and called 
Mid-Term Review of the Agenda 2000 reforms. Saunders and Mayrhofer found out 
that dairy production in the EU will rise with the CAP reform and this has negative 
impacts on NZ for two reasons. Firstly, the lower internal prices in the EU cause the 
returns to NZ from its preferential access to fall. Secondly, higher production in the 
EU has a negative impact on world prices causing returns to NZ from other markets 
to fall also.  
 
Similar results are presented by Saunders (2005). In this study, the impacts of 
Agenda 2000, the Mid-Term Review and the EU agri-environmental programmes on 
the EU and NZ were assessed. The Lincoln Trade and Environment Model was used 
to simulate the impact on the dairy sectors of the EU and NZ of four different policy 
scenarios. The results say that EU milk prices will fall by 8% over the period 1998 to 
2010 as a result of the Agenda 2000 reform. The internal production quota for milk 
in the EU still binds even though it increases by 2.5% over the period. The Mid-Term 
Review will decrease EU milk producer prices even more. However, as before, the 
level of production in the EU actually rises due to the increase in the internal 
production quota, which even at the lower prices still binds. This has again the two 
negative effects on NZ, mentioned in the previous study. The introduction of agri-
environmental policies, conversely, causes internal EU prices to rise as the level of 
production this time is constrained by production practice. NZ prices for raw milk 
rise by 5-13% with increases in NZ production of 5-13%.  
 
Saunders et al. (2006) analysed global agricultural trade policy reforms and their 
impact on the EU, China and NZ, using the Lincoln Trade and Environment Model. 
Their results show that a reduction of export subsidies and tariffs by 50% all over the 
world results in an universal decrease in producer prices and production in the EU 
for livestock products. Price reductions are particularly significant for beef (38.2%). 
In this scenario, the EU switches from being a net exporter of beef, cheese and skim 
milk powder to being a net importer. The impact of the reduction of export subsidies 
and tariffs across all countries leads to benefits for the NZ livestock sector. NZ gains 
most if all countries completely liberalise (complete removal of all countries’ export 
subsidies and tariffs in 2005). Another scenario simulated an increase in the milk 
production quota. In this case, prices for dairy products in the EU decrease, but 
production in the EU increases as a result of the increase in production quota. NZ 
reduces dairy production and NZ exports decrease.  
 
 
The milk production in the United Kingdom (UK) following the 2003 CAP reform 
was modelled by Colman & Harvey (2004). They emphasise the difference between 
the producer ‘incentive’ price for milk and the ‘market’ producer price for milk. To 
the extent that any producers use the SFP to support their dairy business, the 
incentive price driving their decisions will exceed the actual milk price they receive. 
In this case, the UK milk production will remain at full national quota level until 
2015. If producers treat the payment as decoupled, then a lower incentive price will 
apply, more producers will leave the industry and a short-term deficit in output is 
likely; that is, it would fall significantly below the UK national quota in 2010 and 
falling slightly below in 2015. Considering that the UK is one of the lowest cost milk 
producers in the EU-15 (Colman, 2002), this result suggests that milk production in 
other EU countries will fall below quota levels if the SFP is treated as completely 
decoupled. However, Colman and Harvey expect that most producers will effectively 
treat the SFP as coupled and as an aid to enable them to continue dairy farming.  
 
The British Milk Development Council (Farmers Guardian, 2004) interviewed over 
1,200 dairy farmers in the United Kingdom about their future plans after the 
introduction of the Single Farm Payment Scheme. In a survey in April 2004, 75% of 
farmers stated they would use the SFP to support them in dairy farming. Six months 
later, in another survey, this has fallen to 62%, suggesting that more farmers were 
planning to change enterprises if dairying is not profitable in its own right. However, 
still a large percentage of dairy farmers will treat the SFP as if it were coupled and 
hence will use it to subsidise milk production.  
 
A survey conducted by Trantner et al. (2004) came to a similar result. They asked 
4,500 farmers in each of three EU countries (the UK, Germany and Portugal) about 
their response to a proposed bond scheme, corresponding, more or less, to the Single 
Farm Payment Scheme. The survey was carried out in 2001/02, so before the latest 
CAP reform. Around 67-69% of the respondents said they would not alter their mix 
of farm activities after the proposed policy change was introduced. It is interesting to 
see how close this proportion was for each of the three countries (Germany and 
Portugal 67%, UK 69%).  
 
Breen et al. (2005) assessed the impact of decoupling on farming in Ireland. Their 
result is that, despite the significant changes in profitability that decoupling could 
engender, the majority of farmers intend to continue as before and are unlikely to 
change their production patterns. A survey on farmers’ intentions indicates that a 
large number of farmers still seem to consider the decoupled payment linked to 
production. Among other farmers, 499 dairy and 395 beef cattle farmers were 
surveyed about their intentions to remain in dairy/cattle farming. The survey 
indicates that 11% of dairy farmers and 14% of cattle farmers intend to cease their 
activities within the first four years of the Luxembourg Agreement. However, 
analysis of the profitability of Irish dairy farming suggests that up to 32% of farmers 
are likely to exit dairy production over the ten year period from 2002. 
 
An analysis about the 2003 CAP reform from the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2004) concludes that although milk 
production remains bound by the quota, further cuts in the intervention price for 
butter, compared to Agenda 2000, result in lower domestic prices for milk and most 
dairy products, leading to lower production of skimmed and whole milk powder. 
 
Significant drops in EU dairy product exports cause world prices to increase. The 
OECD modelled two scenarios: a ‘maximum decoupling’ and a ‘minimum 
decoupling’ scenario, in which it is assumed that all Member States will either select 
the option that maximises or minimises the degree of decoupling. The impact of 
different direct payment decoupling assumptions on the dairy sector is negligible. In 
both scenarios, the production quota remains binding and the marginal effect of 
direct payments on milk production is zero. EU beef production decreases in both 
scenarios, but does not initially change export levels. However, imports will increase 
by 1.7% from 2004 to 2008 in case of full decoupling. Beef production is estimated 
to be reduced by less if the maximum possible share of beef payments is kept linked 
to beef production. Under these assumptions, beef production is reduced by less than 
0.1% by 2008 compared to 0.6% with maximum decoupling.  
 
Similar to the OECD, the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute 
(FAPRI, 2003) analysed the impact of the Luxembourg CAP reform agreement on 
EU agriculture. They also modelled a maximum and a minimum decoupling 
scenario, according to the Member State’s decisions on the degree of decoupling. 
The baseline is represented by the policies agreed under Agenda 2000. The results 
for the dairy sector under each of the scenarios were very similar. Due to the 
reduction of the intervention price of butter the price of all dairy commodities will 
fall. Nevertheless, the production quota still remained binding and determined the 
milk supply. On the demand side, lower EU product prices meant higher 
consumption and lead to reduced volumes of EU dairy products available for export. 
Decoupling of beef direct payments had a significant impact on the sector. Compared 
to the baseline, EU beef production decreased by 2.6% in the full decoupling 
scenario and by 0.2% in case of minimum decoupling (in the average from 2007 to 
2012). Net imports increased by 241.3% and 22.2%, respectively.  
 
The European Commission (2005) modelled the impact of alternative 
implementation scenarios of the SFP on the EU-25 agricultural sector in 2012. The 
projected situation under the status quo policy implementation (as notified by 
Member States) was compared with two alternative scenarios: full decoupling and 
full coupling of direct payments in line with the provisions of the current legislation. 
The status quo policy implementation scenario predicts an increase in set aside and 
fallow land until 2012 through the introduction of the Single Farm Payment. 
Regarding livestock production, the projections indicate that the EU-25 cattle herd 
would slightly decrease until 2012. This would be the consequence of the quota-
driven structural decline in dairy cow herd size, but also of beef meat production 
abandonment mainly in the Member States with fully decoupled cattle premiums. In 
comparison to the reference scenario, full decoupling of direct payments in 2012 
would lead to a decrease of 1.8% in total EU-25 cattle herd. In contrast, the full 
coupling scenario assumes that Member States couple their direct payments to the 
maximum extent in line with the effective CAP provisions. Compared to the 
reference situation, overall EU-25 cattle herd would increase by 0.5%. 
 
Huettel and Kleinhanss (2004) reviewed a number of studies about CAP reform 
impacts in the dairy sector in different EU countries. They focussed on milk supply 
effects of decoupled direct payments and on changes of producer prices. Their result 
is that the type of decoupling (SFP based on Historic Model or Regional Model) will 
not have significantly different supply effects in the short and medium term. With 
 
regard to the national implementation schemes, only the date of decoupling the milk 
premium was predicted to affect milk supply. Most of the models show an almost 
stable milk supply, even in the case of total decoupling. The milk quota is still 
binding and therefore will be fully used. 
 
According to the present literature, it can be concluded that milk production in the 
EU will continue to be at quota level. Maybe higher internal consumption due to 
lower domestic prices will decrease EU exports and increase NZ exports. EU beef 
production is expected to decrease in all the relevant studies, depending on the 
degree of decoupling.  
 
3. Methodology 
 
The analysis of the implications of the Single Farm Payment in the European Union 
on New Zealand dairy and beef trade will be assessed using an international trade 
model. Basically, there are two methods that are used for modelling international 
trade with a focus on the agricultural sector. These are the economy-wide general 
equilibrium (GE) and partial-economy partial equilibrium (PE) models. The main 
objective of both frameworks is to determine the equilibrium prices and quantities on 
sets of markets, which are subject to various policy shocks. An agriculture focused 
GE model analyses the interactions both within the agricultural sector and with the 
other sectors of the economy. In addition, a GE framework also analyses the 
interactions with the factor markets. An agriculture focused PE model on the other 
hand, analyses the interactions within the agricultural sector only without considering 
the linkages with the rest of economy. PE frameworks integrate technical change, 
population growth and income exogenously, while these variables are generally 
derived endogenously in GE frameworks (Cagatay & Saunders, 2003).  
 
By definition, ‘a partial equilibrium model includes those markets most immediately 
relevant to a problem and excludes everything else’ (Roningen, 1997: 231). While 
this causes practical limitations of applied PE modelling, it is also the source of its 
basic advantage. By focusing on a very limited set of factors, applied PE models 
allow for relatively rapid and transparent analysis of policy issues (Francois & Hall, 
1997). In the economic literature, many different partial equilibrium models can be 
found. Examples are the AGLINK model developed by the OECD, SWOPSIM 
developed by the USDA, VOMM developed by the World Bank and WFM 
developed by the FAO. In order to answer the research questions of this dissertation, 
a PE framework (Lincoln Trade and Environment Model - LTEM) is used.  
 
3.1. Lincoln Trade and Environment Model (LTEM) 
 
This description of the LTEM is based on the work from Cagatay & Saunders 
(2003). The LTEM is a multi-country, multi-commodity PE model focusing on the 
agricultural sector. It includes 17 countries, 19 agricultural commodities and 51 
variables (details in Appendix Tables A1 – A3). The EU is taken as one single 
country which is referred to the EU-15. The dairy sector is modelled as five 
commodities. Raw milk is defined as the farm gate product and is then allocated to 
the liquid milk, butter, cheese, whole milk powder or skim milk powder markets 
 
depending upon their relative prices, subject to physical constraints. The 
commodities included in the model are treated as homogeneous with respect to the 
country of origin and destination and to the physical characteristics of the product. 
Therefore, commodities are perfect substitutes in consumption in international 
markets. Based on these assumptions, the LTEM is a non-spatial model, emphasising 
the net trade of commodities in each country. 
 
The LTEM uses parameters adopted from the literature and hence is a ‘synthetic’ 
model. Interdependencies between primary and processed products and/or between 
substitute/complementary products are reflected by cross-price elasticities. The 
model is used to quantify the price, supply, demand and net trade effects of various 
policy changes. The policy impacts until 2013 are derived in a comparative static 
fashion based on the base year of 2000.  
 
Generally, the LTEM framework contains six behavioural equations and one 
economic identity for each commodity under each country. The behavioural 
equations are domestic supply, demand, stocks, domestic producer and consumer 
price functions and a trade price equation. The economic identity is the net trade 
equation which is equal to excess supply or demand in the domestic economy.  
 
The model basically works by simulating the commodity based world market 
clearing price on the domestic quantities and prices, which may or may not be under 
the effect of policy changes, in each country. Excess domestic supply or demand in 
each country spills over onto the world market to determine world prices. The world 
market-clearing price is determined at the level that equilibrates the total excess 
demand and supply of each commodity in the world market by using a non-linear 
optimisation algorithm. 
 
The price traded in the model for each country is a function of the world price and 
the exchange rate. The producer price is a function of the traded price and policies 
such as producer subsidies, separated into market support and direct payments. The 
producer price for raw milk is a function of the relative prices of the five types of 
dairy products marketed as well as policies. The dairy products marketed are butter, 
cheese, skim milk powder, whole milk powder and liquid milk (the latter is not 
traded in the model but on national level the demand and supply must be in balance). 
Consumer prices are similarly a function of the relative prices and any relative 
policies such as consumer subsidies 
 
The quantity produced is a function of the producer price, the prices of 
substitute/complement commodities and purchase prices of inputs. The consumption 
of a certain product in turn is a function of its price, the income per head as well as 
the price of substitute/complement commodities.  
 
Various unilateral and bilateral agricultural and border policies are simulated through 
the LTEM with some modifications to behavioural equations. The unilateral 
domestic and border policy changes are incorporated in the LTEM via two channels. 
The first channel is through the supply function which allows the simulations of 
direct supply-related policies such as: production quotas, land set-aside policy and 
acreage reduction. The second channel is the price formation equations which allow 
the simulation of various per unit border policies and a minimum price policy, as 
 
well as various per unit producer and consumer support and subsidy domestic and 
trade prices which are incorporated through the price functions. Bilateral policies 
such as preferential access and including trade quotas are also incorporated in the 
LTEM through modifications to the supply, price and net trade equations of the two 
countries. 
 
The LTEM is built using a spreadsheet-based framework using Microsoft Excel 
software and is based on VORSIM, which evolved from SWOPSIM (Roningen et al., 
1991) used to conduct analyses during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations. 
 
3.2. Treatment of the Decoupled SFP in the Model 
 
A critical issue is whether the SFP introduced at the Fischler reforms will be treated 
as coupled or decoupled by farmers. Economic theory suggests that if coupled 
subsidies are replaced with payments that are totally decoupled from production, 
then production should fall to a level that would exist without any subsidies 
(Andersson, 2004). To date, relatively little is known about the supply inducing 
effects of decoupled payments. Research, as reviewed by Burfisher & Hopkins 
(2003) and Goodwin & Mishra (2006), has shown that even fully decoupled 
payments have a production inducing effect as they impact on farmers’ exposure to 
economic risk, their access to capital, and their expectations about the criteria for 
future payments. Swinbank & Tranter (2005) conclude in case of the SFP that the 
retention of the link between the payment and land farmed (cross-compliance) 
weakens the EU’s argument that these payments are truly decoupled. 
 
In the following scenarios, however, it is assumed that the SFP will be treated by 
farmers as completely decoupled, as it is suggested in economic theory. Results in a 
test-run of the model have shown that the differences are negligible whether farmers 
treat the SFP as completely decoupled or only partially decoupled.  
 
Direct payments are included in the LTEM as variable ‘sd’. If the SFP is treated as 
completely decoupled, it can’t be attributed to any farming product and has no 
influence on production. Hence, in case of full decoupling, the direct payments in the 
model are set to zero.  
 
In the case that some direct payments remain still coupled to production (like in 
France and Austria), farmers perceive a higher producer price for the particular 
commodity than the market would give. The coupled suckler cow premium, for 
example, will be treated by beef farmers like a supplement to the beef price. Farmers 
base their production decisions on this higher (perceived) price. This is illustrated in 
Figure 1, depicting the EU markets for two different commodities. The left panel 
represents the market for a product exported by the EU and the right panel shows a 
market where the EU is a net importer. The world market price is depicted by the line 
pw in both panels.  
 
In a situation without direct payments (or completely decoupled direct payments), 
the consumer price (Pc) equals the producer price (Pp). The quantity produced is qA, 
whereas the quantity consumed is qB. The difference between qA and qB is the 
 
amount of production exported (X1 in Panel A) and the imports of the particular 
commodity (M1 in Panel B), respectively.  
 
If there are coupled direct payments in place, the producer incentive price is higher 
than the consumer price by the amount of ‘sd’. This causes a movement along the 
supply curve from the original domestic production A to A’, whereas consumption 
remains at B. The quantity produced increases from qA to qA’. In case of a 
commodity exported by the EU (Panel A), the direct payment will increase the 
exports by X2. If the EU is a net importer of the commodity (Panel B), imports will 
be reduced by M2 as a result of the direct payments. X and M indicate the exports and 
imports, respectively, with direct payments in place. 
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Figure 1: Effects of a Coupled Direct Payment on an Exporting Nation (Panel A) 
and an Importing Nation (Panel B). Source: own illustration, 2006. 
 
The economic effects of the 2003 CAP reform should work exactly in the opposite 
direction as described in Figure 1. The reference scenario is the situation with direct 
payments in place and the other scenarios vary in different degrees of decoupling, 
which means a different reduction of the variable ‘sd’. In the model, the variable ‘sd’ 
is included as a subsidy per unit of output ($/t). In the next chapter, it is explained 
how it is derived. 
 
3.3. Data Sources 
 
The basic data are already incorporated in the LTEM (based on OECD, 2001) and 
have been updated for the base year 2000. They include production, consumption 
and trade data as well as more specific variables like producer market subsidy, 
consumer market subsidy (for all countries included in the model), EU minimum 
prices and sink stocks for EU dairy and meat markets.  
 
 
The values for the direct payments (DPs) are taken from the EU budget data 
(European Commission, 2006c). Data from the year 2001 are used because this in the 
middle of the reference period for the SFP from 2000-2002. The calculation of the 
direct payments is summarised in Figure 2. First, for each scenario the direct 
payments are selected, which will remain coupled even after the introduction of the 
SFP. Then, the direct payments for the different aid schemes are attributed to the 
different products covered by the LTEM. This is done by allocating the arable crops 
payments to wheat and coarse grains taking the ratio of area used for wheat and 
coarse grain production. Furthermore, payments from different schemes which 
benefit one commodity are added up, for example suckler cow premiums, beef 
slaughter premiums, male beef special premiums, and extensification payments are 
all attributed to beef and veal. 
 
In order to receive a $/t value, the summarised direct payments for a specific product 
are divided by the amount of production in the year 2001 (FAO, 2006). The detailed 
data can be found in Appendix Tables A4 and A5. The currency unit used in the 
LTEM is US$. The exchange rate from € to US$ is assumed to be 1.0.  
 
 
DPs according to EU budget data from the year 2001
Still coupled DPs for all commodities in each scenario 
Selection of DPs remaining coupled in each scenario 
allocation to the products covered by the model 
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 2: The Path of Calculating the Direct Payments (DPs) Used in the Different 
Scenarios. Source: own illustration, 2006. 
Scenario Description 
ference scenario provides a base case from which all other policy changes 
simulated. It reflects the existing policies before the Agenda 2000 reforms and 
ontinuation up to the target year 2013. The model includes EU minimum 
ntion prices for butter and skim milk powder, the internal milk production 
export subsidies and the preferential market access for NZ butter and cheese 
EU. Direct payments from the different schemes are included as 100% 
. 
Table 2 gives an overview about the scenarios. The scenarios 1 to 3 include the 2003 
CAP reform and the introduction of the decoupled Single Farm Payment. They vary 
in the degree of decoupling, since Member States had the possibility to remain some 
payments partially coupled to production. Compared to the reference scenario, the 
milk production quota was increased by 1.8% and intervention prices in butter and 
skim milk powder have been decreased. For comparison, scenario 4 assumes a 
complete liberalisation in the EU.  
 
The English implementation scenario simulates a complete decoupling of direct 
payments across the EU. England decided to completely decouple all premiums 
which fall into the single payment scheme. Scenario 1 simulates this situation where 
all direct payments are given to farmers in form of the SFP and it is assumed that 
farmers don’t use the money to subsidise production. There are no direct payments 
left which could be attributed to any specific agricultural commodity. Hence, 
farmer’s behaviour is expected to be the same as if there were no direct payments. 
 
The Austrian implementation scenario mirrors the Austrian implementation, where 
certain direct payments for beef remain coupled. It is the intermediate scenario, 
leaving the suckler cow premium and the slaughter premium for calves completely 
coupled and the slaughter premium for adults 40% coupled. Several Member States 
will use the partial decoupling possibility on beef direct payments. Scenario 2 
considers only these direct payments for beef, all other direct payments are left away, 
since they are included in the SFP and it is assumed, that farmers treat them fully 
decoupled. 
 
The French implementation scenario considers the French implementation of 
decoupling. It models the 2003 CAP reform with the minimal decoupling in the EU. 
France chose to keep coupled as many payments as possible and in this scenario it is 
assumed that all the other Member States would have done the same. Some direct 
payments for cereals, beef and sheep remain coupled. Scenario 3 takes into account 
these direct payments, neglecting the other direct payments which are assumed to be 
treated as completely decoupled.  
 
Scenario 4 illustrates the situation of a complete liberalisation in the EU. This is not 
a realistic scenario so far, but it should give a comparison in order to see what 
changes would be possible with complete liberalisation and how far the 2003 CAP 
reform already liberalises compared to the Agenda 2000 reform. In this scenario, all 
agricultural subsidies in the EU are removed, minimum prices are eliminated and the 
milk production quota is abolished. However, the policies in all other countries are 
not changed.  
 
Table 2: Scenario Assumptions about Different Degrees of Decoupling in EU 
Member States  
 
Reference 
Scenario 
Scenario 1 
(England) 
Scenario 2  
(Austria) 
Scenario 3   
(France) 
Scenario 4 
(Liberalisation) 
direct payments 
according to 
pre-Agenda 
2000 
no direct 
payments 
only direct 
payments for 
beef 
direct payments 
for cereals, beef 
and sheep 
 
no agricultural 
subsidies at all, 
no minimum 
prices 
 
Source: own illustration, 2006.  
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
The model uses 2000 as the base year and simulates out to 2013. It produces a range 
of outputs: producer and consumer prices, quantities produced, quantities consumed, 
quantities traded, and more. Although results are produced for all countries and 
commodities in the model, selected commodities only will be discussed here (dairy 
and beef sectors), and only for the EU and NZ. The results are presented and 
discussed as the differences between the reference case in 2013, and the results of the 
particular policy scenario simulated, in 2013. The producer returns for the EU and 
NZ are calculated by multiplying the quantities produced by the producer price. A 
summary of the results is presented in Table 3, while all results are shown in the 
Appendix Tables A6 and A7.  
 
Table 3: Change in Producer Returns from the Market (%) in the Different 
Scenarios, Compared to the Reference Scenario 
 
EU England Austria France Liberalisation 
Raw milk -0.9 -0.9 -1.0 -11.3 
Beef -21.1 -13.5 -13.4 -64.3 
  
NZ  
Raw milk -2.0 -2.1 -2.0 1.4 
Beef 2.7 1.0 0.9 23.4 
 
Source: Results derived from the LTEM model, 2006.  
 
4.1. English Implementation Scenario 
 
Dairy Sector 
This scenario simulated a complete decoupling of direct payments across the EU, 
like it has been implemented in England. It predicts that milk production will 
increase by the increase in the quota level. Although the intervention prices for butter 
and skim milk powder are reduced and the compensating dairy premium is 
decoupled, the quota still remains binding. The increase in raw milk production also 
leads to an increase in the production of the processed dairy products (around 2% for 
butter, cheese and milk powder). The producer price for raw milk falls by 2.7% while 
the consumer price remains stable. Consumption of dairy products does not change 
after the reforms and hence the increased production in the EU is exported. The 
producer returns from the market in the EU decrease slightly in this scenario (-0.9%). 
However, total farm incomes in the EU don’t decrease since farmers in this scenario 
will get the Single Farm Payment. If the share of the decoupled dairy premium in the 
SFP is added to the market returns, EU milk producers are even better off in this 
scenario than in the reference scenario (3.8% increase in total producer returns).  
 
The consequence of the increased exports from the EU is a slight decrease in the 
producer price for milk products in NZ. NZ dairy production and exports will 
decrease by between 1.5 and 2.0% as a result of the CAP reforms. The returns to NZ 
milk producers fall by 2%.  
 
 
This shows again the effect already noted by Saunders (2005) and Saunders & 
Mayrhofer (2003): the latest CAP reforms have negative impacts on the NZ dairy 
sector due to the rise in the internal milk production quota. The quota increase 
overweighs the effects of a reduction in the intervention prices for butter and skim 
milk powder and the decoupling of the dairy premium.  
 
Colman & Harvey (2004) argue that the decoupling of dairy premium might 
encourage some producers to cease production, but it can be expected that milk 
supply would not be greatly affected, as other producers would take over their milk 
quota. This will lead to a widespread restructuring of production in many countries, 
but the impact on the aggregate sector figures is likely to be limited.  
 
Beef Sector 
In contrast to the dairy sector, the effects of decoupling have a much larger impact on 
the beef sector. Before the 2003 reform, producers have been required to have the 
animal in order to claim the direct payments. This strong link encouraged production, 
although production effects of the payments were somewhat lessened by limits on 
eligible animals and other program provisions. As a result of the decoupling, the 
producer price for beef in the EU falls by 13.7% and this causes beef production to 
decline by 8.6%. Given reduced beef production, and with imports restricted by tariff 
rate quotas (TRQs), EU consumer prices for beef rise by 1.3%. Consumption of beef 
goes slightly down as a response to higher domestic prices. EU beef exports decrease 
significantly by 31.4%. The producer returns from the market fall by 21.1%. On the 
other hand, beef producers still get the Single Farm Payment and so their total 
income will fall only by 9.7%.  
 
Although EU beef exports decrease by over 30%, this has only small implications on 
NZ exports (they increase by 0.4%). In the beef market, both, the EU and NZ are not 
such dominant global players like in the dairy market. The decrease of beef supply to 
the world markets will be mainly compensated by American beef producers, who 
respond to higher beef prices and hence beef exports from the USA (the main global 
beef exporter) will increase. However, the producer price in NZ rises by 2.5% in this 
scenario which leads to a 2.7% increase in producer returns. 
 
4.2. Austrian Implementation Scenario 
 
In Austria, the suckler cow premium and the beef slaughter premium for calves and 
adults will still remain coupled to production, whereas all other direct payments will 
be decoupled. The results in the dairy sector are the same like in the English 
implementation scenario. The only difference in the implementation of the SFP in the 
dairy sector is that England has already decoupled the dairy premium in 2005 and 
Austria will wait until 2007 with the decoupling of the dairy premium. But this won’t 
have any effect in the target year 2013.  
 
EU beef production and exports decrease less in this scenario than in the previous 
one. This shows that the coupled premiums encourage to maintain a higher 
production level than in case of full decoupling. There is a decrease compared to the 
reference scenario because only a part of the beef direct payments still remains 
coupled and not all of them. Beef production goes down by 5.7% and exports 
 
decrease by 21.3%. This leads to a 13.5% decline in the producer returns from the 
market. Considering the Single Farm Payment farmers still receive, farm income will 
fall by 6.7%. Like in the previous scenario, the implications on NZ production and 
exports are negligible. Nevertheless, the returns to NZ producers increase by 1.0% in 
this scenario because of higher producer prices.  
 
4.3. French Implementation Scenario 
 
In this scenario, parts of the direct payments for beef, cereals and sheep meat remain 
coupled. Again, the results for the dairy sector can be compared with those from the 
English implementation scenario. Beef production (-5.4%), exports (-20.4%) and 
producer returns (-13.4%) will fall to a similar extent as in the Austrian 
implementation scenario. This shows that there is no difference in EU beef 
production whether only beef premia stay coupled or if a combination of beef and 
other premia remains coupled. For NZ, there is almost no difference whether the EU 
Member States implement the maximum or minimum degree of decoupling: neither 
in the dairy nor in the beef sector.  
 
The comparison of the French and Austrian implementation scenario with the 
English implementation scenario shows clearly that EU beef production will be 
reduced less if the maximum possible share of beef payments is kept linked to beef 
production. The same results are obtained by the OECD (2004), FAPRI (2003) and 
European Commission (2005). The OECD estimates EU beef production to fall by 
0.6% by 2008 with maximum decoupling and by 0.1% with minimum decoupling. 
Results obtained by the FAPRI forecast a 2.6% decline in the full decoupling 
scenario and a 0.2% decline in the minimum decoupling scenario. The European 
Commission predicts a decrease in the cattle herd as a consequence of beef meat 
production abandonment mainly in the Member States which have fully decoupled 
their cattle premiums.  
 
4.4. Complete Liberalisation Scenario 
 
Dairy Sector 
The results from this scenario are expected to differ significantly to the previous 
ones, but in fact the implications on NZ are very small. Milk production in the EU is 
expected to increase, although the producer price for milk falls by 15.8% as a 
consequence of the removal of all export subsidies, import tariffs, minimum prices 
and the milk production quota. Milk production exceeds the current quota level by 
7.4% and production of dairy products except whole milk powder increases. The 
returns to EU milk producers are reduced by 11.3% due to the lower prices. 
Consumer prices for dairy products fall between 15% and 20%. The lower domestic 
market prices of dairy products boost consumption in the EU more than production is 
increased. The consumption of main milk products rises between 6 and 8%. In the 
case of butter, the EU switches to a net importer. Cheese exports increase slightly, 
but exports in milk powder decrease significantly.  
 
Surprisingly, the effects of a complete liberalisation in the EU on the NZ dairy sector 
are minimal. The producer price for milk rises in New Zealand by 1.8%, but there is 
 
little response: neither production nor exports increase. However, the returns to NZ 
milk producers grow by 1.4%. 
 
Beef Sector 
A complete liberalisation in EU agricultural production and trade has significant 
effects on the NZ beef sector. In this scenario, the beef producer price in the EU 
decreases by almost 50%, causing production to fall by 30.2%. As a result, EU beef 
producer returns fall by 64.3%. The consumer price goes down by 40%, which 
results in a 41.4% increase in consumption. The EU switches from being a big net 
exporter in beef to being a big net importer. World market prices rise significantly 
(16.7%), giving NZ producers an incentive to increase production by 5.7%. Finally, 
NZ beef exports grow by 7.6% and producer returns by 23.4%. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The 2003 CAP reform introduced a partial shift from direct aid to European farmers 
being linked to production to direct aid payments decoupled from production. 
Farmers are expected to base their production decisions more on market signals 
rather than CAP subsidies. This should lead to a reduction in outputs, while keeping 
farm incomes stable. The hypothesis in this study was that a decoupling of direct 
payments would lead to a lower production in the EU and hence would increase NZ 
exports of dairy and beef products. 
 
The introduction of cross-compliance links farm support with other societal 
objectives. In order to get the payments, farmers have to comply with certain 
environmental standards and maintain their land in good agricultural and 
environmental condition. However, the impact of cross-compliance on production 
might be moderate since the required environmental standards have already been 
existing law in all Member States. New is only that the compliance with these rules 
since January 2005 is prerequisite for farmers to get the full amount of the SFP. 
 
Modelling results show in the dairy sector that the milk production quota increase in 
the CAP reform overweighs the reduction in the intervention prices for butter and 
skim milk powder in combination with the decoupling of the dairy premium. 
Although the price support in the EU dairy market is slightly reduced, producer 
prices will remain that high that there still is the incentive to produce at the increased 
quota level. The result is the opposite of the original assumption: EU exports in dairy 
products will increase following the reform and this implies NZ exports to fall by 
1.5% to 2.0%. As a consequence of lower prices, the producer returns for raw milk 
decrease in the EU by 1% and in NZ by 2%. The different implementation schemes 
of the Member States have no influence on this result.  
 
Outputs in the beef sector will be reduced as a result of the 2003 CAP reform. Beef 
production will become less intensive, with a reduction in the density of cows per 
hectare, particularly in the Member States which have fully decoupled their cattle 
premiums (like the United Kingdom). The modelling results show that the reduction 
in EU beef production, producer returns and exports is less when beef direct 
payments remain coupled (like in Austria and France). The market changes in the 
EU, however, are not well transmitted to NZ because other beef producers (like the 
 
USA) are more important in world trade. Nevertheless, the returns to NZ beef 
producers increase due to higher world prices. NZ producer returns increase with a 
higher rate if full decoupling in the EU is applied then in case of only partial 
decoupling.  
 
In another scenario a complete liberalisation of the EU’s agricultural markets was 
simulated. The result is that milk production would be higher due to the abolition of 
the quota, but consumption would rise to a greater extent due to lower domestic 
prices in the EU, this leaving the implications on NZ insignificant. A complete 
liberalisation would lead to a change in the beef market from the EU being a net 
exporter to being a net importer. As a consequence, NZ beef exports would rise by 
7.6% and producer returns by 23.4%.  
 
This liberalisation scenario showed a result significantly different from the other 
scenarios modelling the 2003 reform implementations, which is explained by the fact 
that the latter still use important market price support tools. Domestic support and 
trade measures still prevent market forces from fully guiding production decisions 
and have implications on the EU’s agricultural trade. Particularly in the beef sector 
NZ could gain from a further liberalisation in the EU.  
 
The results from the modelling of the beef sector have shown that the 2003 CAP 
reform with the process of decoupling was an important step towards reducing trade-
distorting agricultural policy in the EU. It is significant from the point of view of 
farmers since market forces will play a more important role in their production 
decisions. Output effects will depend on how farmers will use the money they 
receive from the decoupled SFP. However, the budget spent on the CAP will remain 
roughly at the same level from 2007 until 2013. 
 
The Single Farm Payment will play a greater role in the future of the Common 
Agricultural Policy. The budget for the SFP has already been increased in the recent 
sugar market reform this year and eventually will rise further in upcoming reforms 
(wine and fruit and vegetable markets). Since the total budget for the CAP is fixed 
until 2013, there will be less and less money left over for non-SFP forms of 
agricultural market support. In addition, the pressure to get rid of export subsidies is 
significant. The EU agricultural Commissioner has shown willingness to accept the 
elimination of export subsidies by 2013 in the framework of the WTO Doha Round 
negotiations. These two factors will constrain the intervention mechanism in the milk 
market and therefore a further reform in the EU milk sector can be expected. 
According to the modelling results in this study it is not sure if such a reform is 
wanted by New Zealanders. A liberalisation in the EU milk sector does not increase 
New Zealand’s exports, but probably would be the end of New Zealand’s preferential 
market access to the EU butter market.  
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7. Appendix 
 
Table A1: Countries Included in the LTEM 
 
ID Country ID Country 
AR Argentina NI New Independent States 
AU Australia NO Norway 
CI China NZ New Zealand 
CN Canada PO Poland 
CZ Czech Republic SL Slovakia 
EU European Union (15) SW Switzerland 
HU Hungary TU Turkey 
JP Japan US United States 
MX Mexico RW Rest of World 
 
 
Table A2: Commodity Coverage of the LTEM 
 
ID Commodity ID Commodity 
WH Wheat WL Wool 
CG Coarse grains PY Poultry meat 
SU Sugar (refined) EG Eggs 
RI Rice MK Raw milk 
OS Oilseeds ML Milk (liquid, other products) 
OM Oilseed meals BT Butter 
OL Oils CH Cheese 
BV Beef and Veal MW Whole milk powder 
SH Sheep meat MS Skim milk powder 
PG Pig meat   
 
 
Table A3: Policy Variables / Parameters and Non-Agricultural Exogenous 
Variables 
 
Policy Variable- 
Domestic Market 
Policy Variables-   
Border 
Non-Agricultural 
Exogenous Variables 
Land set-aside Import tariff Gross domestic product 
Production quota Export subsidy Country price index 
Support/minimum price Trade quota Population 
Producer market subsidy In-quota tariff Exchange rate 
Producer input subsidies Export tax  
Producer direct payments   
Producer general services   
Consumer market subsidy   
 
Table A4: Direct Payment Expenditure in 2001 for Selected Schemes in the 
EU-15 (in million €) 
 
Scheme Direct Payments (€)
Suckler-cow premiums 1 705
Additional premiums for suckler-cows 72
Beef slaughter premiums 494
Beef special premiums 1 530
Beef extensification premiums 914
Additional payments to beef producers 148
Ewe and goat premiums 1 050
Ewe and goat premiums in less favoured areas 354
Aid for producers of maize 1 486
Aid for producers of cereals (except maize) 10 018
Aid for producers of soy beans, rape and sunflower seed 1 984
Supplementary aid for durum wheat 1 074
Aid for grass silage 58
Production aid for dried fodder 306
Set-aside 1 536
 
 
 
Table A5: Amounts of Production of Selected Commodities in the EU-15 in 
2001 (in 1 000 tonnes) 
 
Commodity Production (1 000 tonnes)
Raw milk (production quota) 118 392
Beef 7 361
Sheepmeat 1 098
Coarse grains 108 207
Wheat 92 103
Oilseeds 14 473
 
 
 
Table A6: Model Results for the EU for the Year 2013 (producer price (pp) and 
consumer price (pc) in US$; quantity produced (qp), quantity 
consumed (qc) and quantity traded (qt) in 1 000 tonnes; producer 
returns (pr) in 1 000 000 US$) 
 
 Scenarios 
 
Ref UK %  UK-Ref AT
%  
AT-Ref FR
%  
FR-Ref Lib 
%  
Lib-Ref
     
ppBV 4476 3865 -13.7 4103 -8.3 4099 -8.4 2289 -48.9
ppMK 761 741 -2.7 741 -2.7 740 -2.8 628 -17.4
ppBT 6152 5970 -3.0 5969 -3.0 5964 -3.1 4932 -19.8
ppCH 8626 8374 -2.9 8373 -2.9 8365 -3.0 7097 -17.7
ppMW 3275 3168 -3.3 3169 -3.3 3165 -3.4 2561 -21.8
ppMS 3743 3628 -3.0 3629 -3.0 3624 -3.2 2964 -20.8
      
pcBV 3816 3865 1.3 3841 0.7 3836 0.5 2289 -40.0
pcMK 482 482 0.0 482 0.0 482 0.0 482 0.0
pcBT 5987 5970 -0.3 5969 -0.3 5964 -0.4 4932 -17.6
pcCH 8417 8374 -0.5 8373 -0.5 8365 -0.6 7097 -15.7
pcMW 3178 3168 -0.3 3169 -0.3 3165 -0.4 2561 -19.4
pcMS 3636 3629 -0.2 3629 -0.2 3624 -0.3 2964 -18.5
      
qpBV 9598 8774 -8.6 9053 -5.7 9076 -5.4 6696 -30.2
qpMK 118392 120505 1.8 120505 1.8 120505 1.8 127173 7.4
qpBT 1766 1805 2.2 1805 2.2 1804 2.2 1827 3.5
qpCH 7508 7645 1.8 7644 1.8 7643 1.8 7922 5.5
qpMW 828 847 2.3 847 2.4 847 2.3 827 -0.1
qpMS 987 1009 2.2 1009 2.2 1009 2.2 1021 3.5
      
qcBV 7142 7089 -0.7 7119 -0.3 7121 -0.3 10096 41.4
qcBT 1763 1769 0.3 1768 0.3 1768 0.3 1866 5.8
qcCH 6214 6232 0.3 6231 0.3 6233 0.3 6585 6.0
qcMW 413 413 0.1 413 0.1 413 0.1 446 8.2
qcMS 924 925 0.0 925 0.0 925 0.1 985 6.5
      
qtBV 2456 1684 -31.4 1934 -21.3 1955 -20.4 -3400 -238.4
qtBT 3 37 1069.1 37 1078.3 37 1069.6 -39 -1339.5
qtCH 1309 1427 9.0 1428 9.1 1425 8.9 1337 2.1
qtMW 415 434 4.6 434 4.6 433 4.4 380 -8.4
qtMS 63 84 34.2 84 34.0 84 33.2 37 -41.6
      
prBV 42959 33911 -21.1 37146 -13.5 37203 -13.4 15327 -64.3
prMK 90114 89283 -0.9 89272 -0.9 89196 -1.0 79914 -11.3
prBT 10866 10776 -0.8 10772 -0.9 10761 -1.0 9013 -17.1
prCH 64763 64016 -1.2 64005 -1.2 63939 -1.3 56222 -13.2
prMW 2711 2683 -1.0 2684 -1.0 2679 -1.2 2117 -21.9
prMS 3695 3661 -0.9 3661 -0.9 3655 -1.1 3027 -18.1
 
BV = beef and veal; MK = raw milk; BT = butter; CH = cheese; MW = whole milk powder; 
MS = skim milk powder 
 
Table A7: Model Results for NZ for the Year 2013 (producer price (pp) and 
consumer price (pc) in US$; quantity produced (qp), quantity 
consumed (qc) and quantity traded (qt) in 1 000 tonnes; producer 
returns (pr) in 1 000 000 US$) 
 
 Scenarios 
 Ref UK % UK-Ref AT
% 
AT-Ref FR
% 
FR-Ref Lib 
% 
Lib-Ref
          
ppBV 1532 1571 2.5 1552 1.3 1548 1.1 1788 16.7
ppMK 245 244 -0.4 244 -0.4 244 -0.5 249 1.8
ppBT 1952 1945 -0.4 1944 -0.4 1942 -0.5 1985 1.7
ppCH 3188 3168 -0.6 3168 -0.6 3164 -0.7 3213 0.8
ppMW 1963 1955 -0.4 1955 -0.4 1952 -0.5 2020 2.9
ppMS 2059 2054 -0.2 2054 -0.2 2050 -0.4 2110 2.5
          
pcBV 1527 1565 2.5 1547 1.3 1543 1.1 1782 16.7
pcMK 194 194 0.0 194 0.0 194 0.0 194 0.0
pcBT 1952 1945 -0.4 1944 -0.4 1942 -0.5 1985 1.7
pcCH 3188 3168 -0.6 3168 -0.6 3164 -0.7 3213 0.8
pcMW 1963 1955 -0.4 1955 -0.4 1952 -0.5 2020 2.9
pcMS 2059 2054 -0.2 2054 -0.2 2050 -0.4 2110 2.5
          
qpBV 658 659 0.2 656 -0.3 656 -0.2 695 5.7
qpMK 14689 14441 -1.7 14434 -1.7 14475 -1.5 14624 -0.4
qpBT 510 501 -1.7 501 -1.8 502 -1.5 509 -0.2
qpCH 457 449 -1.8 449 -1.8 450 -1.6 455 -0.4
qpMW 553 543 -1.8 543 -1.8 544 -1.5 552 -0.1
qpMS 380 374 -1.7 374 -1.8 375 -1.5 380 -0.2
          
qcBV 78 77 -1.3 78 -0.6 78 -0.5 72 -8.1
qcBT 26 26 0.2 26 0.2 26 0.2 26 -0.7
qcCH 35 35 0.3 35 0.3 35 0.3 35 -0.3
qcMW 1 1 0.3 1 0.3 1 0.3 1 -1.1
qcMS 7 7 0.1 7 0.1 7 0.2 7 -1.0
          
qtBV 578 581 0.4 577 -0.3 577 -0.2 622 7.6
qtBT 478 469 -1.9 469 -1.9 470 -1.6 477 -0.2
qtCH 407 399 -2.0 399 -2.1 400 -1.8 405 -0.5
qtMW 552 542 -1.8 542 -1.8 544 -1.5 552 -0.1
qtMS 373 366 -1.8 366 -1.8 367 -1.6 372 -0.2
          
prBV 1008 1035 2.7 1018 1.0 1016 0.9 1243 23.4
prMK 3597 3524 -2.0 3521 -2.1 3527 -2.0 3647 1.4
prBT 995 975 -2.1 974 -2.2 975 -2.0 1010 1.5
prCH 1458 1423 -2.4 1422 -2.5 1424 -2.3 1463 0.3
prMW 1085 1062 -2.1 1061 -2.2 1063 -2.1 1116 2.8
prMS 783 767 -2.0 767 -2.0 768 -1.9 801 2.3
 
BV = beef and veal; MK = raw milk; BT = butter; CH = cheese; MW = whole milk powder; 
MS = skim milk powder 
 
